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to enjoin creditors from suing on, or using any process to
collect, a discharged debt.
PROMISE TO PAY DISCHARGED DEBT

A new promise to pay a debt discharged in bankruptcy is
actionable without new consideration, in Louisiana4 0 as elsewhere. 41 The promise may be made at any time after the filing
of the petition in bankruptcy, 42 but it must be "definite, express,
distinct, and unambiguous." ' 48 These requirements were satisfied
in Credithrift of America, Inc. v. Nash,44 where the court found
a specific promise to pay at a fixed future time. A mere acknowledgement of the debt with an expression of intent
to pay at
45
an indefinite time would not have been sufficient.
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NoN-DomIcIIARIEs' "JOINT AccoUNTs" IN LOUISIANA

Louisiana law of things does not admit of co-ownership with
right of survivorship, the essence of "joint" interests in things
according to the traditional Anglo-American law. Thus, two
Mississippians having a joint bank account in Mississippi justifiably could expect to have the survivor of them become owner
of the whole. Conversely, two Louisianians having what is
known here as a "joint" bank account should not expect the

survivor of them to become owner of the whole; they should
understand that the "jointness" of an account is not a reference
to ownership thereof, but to the right of either of them to withdraw funds therefrom without prejudice to the depositary. On
the other hand, Louisianians having a joint bank account in
Mississippi might or might not anticipate the result under Mississippi law, and Mississippians having a "joint" bank account
in Louisiana might or might not expect the result under Louisiana law.
40. Irwin v. Hunnewell, 207 La. 422, 21 So.2d 485 (1945).

41. 1A W.

COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY

§ 17.33 (1971).

42. Id. § 17.36.
43. Id. § 17.34.
44. 256 So.2d 308 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1971).
45. Securities Fin. Co. v. Washington, 195 So.2d 733 (La. App. 1st Cir.
(1967).
0 Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
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Dawson v. Capital Bank' involved the latter situation. A
"joint" account had been opened here in the names of two Mississippians and the survivor of them claimed ownership of the
whole. The trial court honored the survivor's contention, thus
giving effect to what probably had been the expectancy of the
parties themselves. The trial court, nevertheless, had not analysed the legal situation well and as a result had used an inappropriate conflicts rule. The error of the trial judge was that
he had (at least implicitly) treated the whole of the account as
a movable in the deceased's succession and stated that Mississippi
law applied to determine the distribution of movables in a Mississippian's succession, but then had applied the survivorship
rule of Mississippi joint interests instead of the Mississippi law
on the distribution of movables on death. The court of appeal
reversed, holding that ownership of the funds in the account
would be determined by Louisiana law and that succession to
the deceased party's interest would be determined by Mississippi
law.
The decision of the court of appeal is in conformity with
Louisiana Civil Code articles 9 and 491 at least insofar as it
recognized the deceased depositor as the owner of the funds in
the "joint" account. Article 491 forbids dispositions of things
to be made in Louisiana in such a manner as to create interests
not recognized by Louisiana law, and article 9 states more generally that things in this state belonging to non-domiciliarles
are subject to the laws of this state. But in applying the general
conflict of laws rule that succession to movables is governed by
the law of the decedent's domicile-the usual practice in Louisiana-the court may have violated articles 9 and 491, for those
articles could be construed to require that Louisiana succession
laws be applied to determine the inheritance of movables situated in Louisiana even if the deceased owner was domiciled
elsewhere at the time of his death.
In the writer's opinion only the trial court's decision did
justice, even if for the wrong reason, for it alone probably conformed to the deceased depositor's intention in opening the
"joint" account. She was a Mississippian and probably conceived
of her action in terms of Mississippi law. If this is correct, then
the reasonableness of Civil Code articles 9 and 491 is called into
1. 261 So.2d 727 (LA.

App. 1st Cir. 1972).
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question, for they led to results contrary to the expectancies of
the parties; and these expectancies were both legitimate according to the law of the political society of which they were members and of no concern whatsoever to the persons belonging to
the political society of Louisiana. Had the situation been one of
a Louisianian transacting with one of the Mississippi parties to
the Louisiana joint account, then reason would be on the side of
protecting the Louisianian's expectancy according to Louisiana
law. Non-Louisianians transacting with Louisianians in Louisiana reasonably can expect the Louisianians to transact in the context of Louisiana law. But no such third party was involved
here. The only parties concerned were Mississippians. Recognizing the survivorship expectancy of those parties to money could
not possible prejudice any reasonable concern for good order in
Louisiana.
It is submitted that articles 9 and 491 of the Civil Code, and
all other state laws prescribing conflict of laws rules, cannot be
considered obligatory when found to be unreasonable claims or
denials of state legislative or judicial competence. The conflict
of laws in the United States cannot be, as the Restatement2
(Second) Conflict of Laws claims it is, a branch of state law.
It is a subject completely under the authority of Congress by
reason of the express provisions of full faith and credit clause
of the Constitution and, in default of congressional action, arguably, subject to final determination by the U. S. Supreme Court.
The U. S. Supreme Court has admitted this tacitly every time
it has rendered a decision on the full faith and credit to be given
laws and judgments, for the necessity of giving full faith and
credit implies the necessity of criteria for legislative and judicial
competence. Were the matter one of state rather than federal
competence, the U. S. Supreme Court could have no right to
render any decision on the subject. This being so, state conflicts
rules can be honored only so long as they meet the reasonable
standards for full faith and credit.8 For the reasons given above,
it is submitted that the application of Civil Code articles 9 and
491 to the facts of the instant case does not meet constitutional
standards.
2. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CoNFuIcT OF LAWS (1970) § 2; but see the implicit
contradiction of § 2 in § 9, according to which a state may not make an
"unreasonable" assignment of legislative competence, and the comments
thereunder citing U.S. Supreme Court decisions as authority.
3. The writer has mentioned this view in previous Symposia. See 32 LA.
L. REv. 295, 296-97 (1972); 31 LA. L. Rzv. 312, 314 (1971).
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DIVORCE JURISDICTION

Hudman v. Hudman4 continues Boudreaux v. Welch's misconstruction of the U. S. Supreme Court's decision in Johnson
v. Muelberger.6 In so, doing Hudman reinforces Boudreaux's
invitation to evade Louisiana's lawful legislative and judicial
jurisdiction over its domiciliaries' marital status by refusing to
hear attacks on a judgment of divorce rendered in another state
even when the parties themselves admit fully their having falsely alleged or admitted the domicile of the plaintiff to be in the
state in which the suit was brought. Previous discussions of the
situation have been sufficient, however, and need not be repeated. 7 It is to be hoped that attacks on Boudreaux v. Welch
will continue until the judiciary recognizes its error.
LEx Loci DELICTI

Two decisions by the Third Circuit Court of Appeal, Sullivan
v. Hardware Mutual Casualty Co.8 and Jagers v. Royal Indemnity Co.9 follow the Louisiana supreme court's 1970 decision in
Johnson v. St. Paul Mercury Insurance Co.,10 which refused to
abandon the now discredited "law of the place of the wrong"
rule in determining the rights and obligations of the parties to
each other. The discussion of that issue need not be repeated
here." It is interesting to note, however, that in Deane v. McGee' 2 the supreme court apparently did not consider the lex
loci delicti relevant in determining whether the "other insurance" clauses in "uninsured motorist" policies issued in Florida
to the Florida plaintiffs should be considered valid, though it did
temper its opinion with the observation that the same result
would follow from the application of Louisiana law.
PROOF OF SISTER-STATE LAws

The Sullivan'8 and Jagers14 decisions discussed above both
4. 259 So.2d 619 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1972).
5. 249 La. 983, 192 So.2d 356 (1966).
6. 340 U.S. 581 (1951).
7. See the author's previous Symposia remarks in 28 LA. L. REV. 312,
322-26 (1968) and 31 LA. L. REv. 312, 314-16 (1971).
8. 260 So.2d 35 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1972).
9. 257 So.2d 806 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1972).
10. 256 La. 289, 236 So.2d 216 (1970).
11. See the author's Symposium comments in 31 LA. L. Rzv. 312, 321-22
(1971).
12. 261 La. 684, 260 So.2d 669 (1972).
13. 260 So.2d 35 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1972).
14. 257 So.2d 806 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1972).
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involved proof of sister-state laws. In Sullivan copies of the
relevant sister-state laws and judgments had been provided the
judge and no issue was raised. In Jagers the defendant introduced affidavit memoranda by Mississippi attorneys concluding
that Mississippi law forbade parent to sue minor child. The
majority ruled the authorities cited did not support the conclusion of the memoranda and then "presumed" Misssisippi law to
be the same as that of Louisiana. It is submitted that a Louisiana judge is never at liberty to presume that a sister-state's law
is the same as that of Louisiana. Article 1319 of the Code of Civil
Procedure provides that Louisiana courts "shall" take judicial
notice of sister-state "common law and statutes." The only
liberty judges have under article 1319 is to ascertain the sisterstate's laws by their own efforts or to call upon counsel to obtain the information for them. In the writer's opinion, admittedly contrary to long-standing practice, the full faith and credit
clause of the United States Constitution properly construed
itself, requires every state court to honor the valid and applicable law of every other state, and therefore to discover what it is
in order to apply it. In this view article 1319 adds nothing to
the constitutional requirement.
INSURANCE
W. Shelby McKenzie*
The Louisiana supreme court in Graham v. American Casualty Co.1 and Deane v. McGee,2 overruled numerous decisions
from all four courts of appeal in order to permit "stacking" of
the coverages under uninsured motorist policies, finding that the
language of the "other insurance" clauses limiting liability was
inconsistent with the statute requiring that each liability policy
contain uninsured motorist coverage in a specified minimum
amount. These important decisions are noted elsewhere in this
Review.3
The application of the exclusion in automobile liability policies for persons employed in the automobile business has been
* Special Lecturer in Law, Louisiana State University; Member, Baton

Rouge Bar.
1. 261 La. 85, 259 So.2d 22 (1972).

2. 261 La. 686, 260 So.2d 669 (1972).
3. 33 .A. L. REv. 145 (1972).

